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Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) are mostly implemented to circumvent 
budgetary constraints, and to encourage efficiency and quality in the 
provision of public infrastructure in order to reach social welfare. One of 
the ways of reaching the latter objective is by the introduction of 
performance based standards tied to bonuses and penalties to reward or 
punish the performance of the contractor. This paper focuses on the 
implementation of safety based incentives in PPPs in such a way that the 
better the safety outcome the greater larger will be the economic reward to 
the contractor. The main aim of this paper is to identify whether the 
incentives to improve road safety in PPPs are ultimately effective in 
improving safety ratios in Spain. To that end, Poisson and negative 
binomial regression models have been applied using information of 
motorways of the Spanish network of 2006. The findings indicate that even 
though road safety is highly influenced by variables that are not much 
controllable by the contractor such as the Average Annual Daily Traffic 
and the percentage of heavy vehicles, the implementation of safety 
incentives in PPPs has a positive influence in the reduction of fatalities, 
injuries and accidents. 
Keywords: Pubic Private Partnerships, performance based standards, road 
safety, incentives, motorway concession contract.  
INTRODUCTION 
 
One of the most common ways of implementing PPPs in managing 
infrastructure is through the concession approach, which consists basically in 
transferring final design, construction, maintenance, and operation of the 
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infrastructure to a private consortium, in exchange for which that consortium 
receives the right to charge a fee to the user or to the government on behalf of 
the user, for a period of time contractually agreed in advance (Vassallo and 
Gallego 2005).  
 
One of the key aspects of PPPs is to encourage the private sector to manage 
and operate the infrastructure in the best way. To that end, in the last few 
years, PPPs are evolving from mere demand-based contracts (when the 
revenues of the contractor are related to the traffic demand) to performance-
based contracts referred to different aspects such as availability, congestion, 
state of the pavement, safety, and so on.  Consequently, the revenues of the 
contractor tend to depend more and more to the quality of the services rather 
than on traffic demand (Harding et al 2010).  
 
Two reasons lie behind this trend. First, PPP contractors can manage better 
the service performance they offer than the traffic flows in the infrastructure. 
And second, by encouraging the PPP contractors to provide a better service, 
by aligning the social and the private benefits, they will end up producing a 
more efficient outcome for society.  
 
Traditionally, most of the infrastructure management contracts, including 
PPPs, had not introduced explicit incentives to improve quality. However, 
nowadays most PPP contracts are encouraging the introduction of incentives 
to foster the contractor to provide an optimal quality level. In this way, the 
contracts incorporate a set of standards that the contractor must fulfill. If the 
contractor fails to comply with these requirements, the public authority will 
penalize the contractor or even rescind the contract. There are two ways of 
rewarding or penalizing the contractor: incentives related to the extension of 
the deadline of the project, and incentives related to increase the fee to be 
paid to the PPP contractor.  
 
This approach has moved many countries to introduce performance based 
indicators tied to bonuses and penalties in their PPP contracts. Some 
countries such as United Kingdom, Finland, Portugal and Spain have 
introduced these kind of incentives. 
 
The aim of this paper is to identify whether the incentives to improve road 
safety in PPPs are ultimately effective in improving safety ratios with an 
empirical analysis for the case of Spain. The results show that there are more 
fatalities, injuries and accidents on road segments without incentives when 




The authors have not found any empirical study about safety incentives 
offered to the PPP contractors.  
 
ANALYSIS OF EXPERIENCES IN THE INTRODUCTION 
OF ROAD SAFETY INCENTIVES IN EUROPE 
Europe is the world‘s region with the greater tradition of incorporating 
performance-based incentives in PPPs. There are few countries with PPP 
roads that introduce positive incentives based on explicit road safety 
indicators. These countries where this was done, it became a normal practice 
and the latest PPP contracts continue to introduce and improve these 
incentives. This happens in Spain, Finland, Hungary, Norway, Portugal and 
United Kingdom. Italy introduced price-caps tied to road safety indicators in 
such a way that the concessionaire is allow to set higher tolls if the safety 
ratios are better. In Ireland, PPP road contracts include some road safety 
indicators but they do not provide bonuses. In other countries, like Denmark, 
the Netherlands and Belgium, there are new and sophisticated PPP contracts, 
but they do not have positive incentives based on explicit road safety 
indicators. 
 
The design of the road safety indicators is quite heterogeneous across 
different countries. There are differences both in the variable adopted to 
measure the outcome and in the final formula employed. Most of the PPPs 
include number of injuries, number of fatalities or a combination of number 
of light accidents, serious accidents and fatal accidents to build the indicator.  
 
On the other hand, including the exposure to the risk (expressed by traffic) is 
a generalized practice. Very often, the initial accident data is divided by the 
annual traffic, usually measured in terms of millions or billions of vehicles-
kilometers. E18 road (Muurla–Lohja) in Finland, the M6 road in Hungary, 
several PPPs in Portugal (the IP-4, for instance) and the latest PPP roads 
awarded in Spain use this methodology. The advantage of introducing the 
exposure to the risk (traffic) explicitly is that distortions in road safety results 
are reduced. 
 
With the same aim, in many other PPP contracts the assessment of the 
indicator is done by comparing similar roads, in terms of traffic, number of 
carriageways, etc. With this methodology it is possible to control the global 
evolution of casualties by many factors, most of them not manageable by the 
road operator. Some road contracts where the indicator is set in this way are 
E-18 road (Grimstad – Kristiansand) in Norway, the latest PPP roads 
awarded in the United Kingdom (for example, A1 & M25) and some PPP 
roads in Spain (like the M-407 motorway).  
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Regarding the way of rewarding or penalizing the contractor, it was identified 
two trends: incentives related to the extension of the deadline of the project, 
and incentives related to increase the fee to be paid to the PPP contractor.  
 
CHARACTERISTICS OF MOTORWAYS IN SPAIN 
Spain has extensive experience in managing and financing motorways 
through public-private-partnerships (PPPs). Most of the PPPs have been put 
into effect through concession contracts that have a long tradition in Spanish 
administrative law. Most of the motorway concessions awarded in Spain 
have been toll motorways. However, in the last few years, there was a large 
increase in the number of other PPP approaches, such as shadow-toll or 
performance-based contracts. 
 
Three different periods regarding the implementation of motorway 
concessions in Spain can be identified: from 1967 to 1975, from 1976 to 
1995, and from 1996 to the present. Between 1967 and 1975, 2,042 km of toll 
motorways were granted by the central government of Spain. The results of 
the implementation of concession contracts in Spain during this period were 
rather controversial. On the one hand, motorway concessions achieved the 
goal of providing the country with a modern motorway network at a time 
when the public budget of Spain was not sufficient to afford such a huge cost. 
On the other hand, the guarantees made by the government to facilitate 
concessions‘ funding over time became very costly for the country (Izquierdo 
and Vassallo 2004). 
 
The second stage of motorway concessions is from 1976 to 1995. In this 
period, no motorway concessions were awarded. There were several reasons 
for this. First, the two petroleum crises in the 1970s destabilized the Spanish 
economy. Second, after Franco‘s death, the political atmosphere in Spain was 
uncertain. Third, and most important, the Socialist government, which took 
office in 1982 and remained until 1996, was politically opposed to promoting 
private concessions as a means to finance motorways. Instead, the socialist 
government opted for modernizing the Spanish road network by widening 
and upgrading the most important roads, turning them into dual-roadway fast 
lanes. These free motorways were called ―autovías”.   
 
The term ―autovías‖ was used in Spain for identifying any free motorway 
with physically separated lanes in each direction. The first autovías in Spain 
were built by doubling lanes out of single carriageways. The design standards 
of these motorways (known as first generation autovías) had design standards 
well below those of the toll motorways. 
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Since 2000, the quality standards in the construction of autovías improved 
notably to make comparable with toll motorways. These are called second 
generation autovías. There is no technical difference between second 
generation autovías and toll motorways. The first generation autovías and 
second generation autovías were built, funded and managed by the Spanish 
government. None of the public motorways (autovías) has economic 
incentives to improve road safety though the government is committed to 
building and maintaining the autovías with socially expected quality 
standards.  
 
The third stage began in 1996 and continues into the present. In 1996, the 
conservative Popular Party took office in Spain. The need to contain Spain‘s 
public deficit was the most difficult challenge facing the new government. 
This was the main reason why the new government decided to implement 
once again the policy of offering concessions so as to encourage the 
participation of the private sector in financing new transportation 
infrastructure. From 1996 to now, 1,003 kilometers of new toll motorway 
concessions have been awarded by the central government of Spain through 
this approach. Another novelty of the period since 1996 is that not only the 
Spanish central government, but also the regional and even the local 
governments have started using the concession approach to implement both 
toll and shadow-toll motorways.  
 
Most of the PPPs implemented in the last stage include a provision to extend 
the contract duration up to four years if several performance-based indicators 
tied to quality aspects like queuing in toll plazas, congestion, state of the 
pavement, safety, and satisfaction of the users are ultimately fulfilled. Other 
PPP‘s awarded recently in Spain also include incentives in terms of annual 
bonuses to be incorporated to the periodic fee paid by the government to the 
contactor.  
 
Regarding safety, the PPP contractor can be granted an extension of the 
contract if safety indicators remain below an accident benchmark for similar 
roads. To that propose the government measures in a yearly basis the Risk 
Index (RI) and Mortality Index (MI) of the motorways and compare it with 








MODELS THAT EXPLAIN ROAD SAFETY: A 
LITERATURE REVIEW  
This paper analyzes whether the incentives to improve road safety in PPPs 
are effective. The statistical models most commonly used to explain the 
relationship between motor vehicle accidents and a set of predictor variables 
are the Poisson and NB regression models (Miaou and Lum 1993; Noland 
and Oh 2004; Chang 2005; Caliendo et al 2007). 
 
From an empirical stand-point, the relationship between accident frequency 
and traffic flows can be found in Jovanis and Chang (1986), Abdel-Aty and 
Essam Radwan (2000) and Persaud et al (2000); and the relationship between 
accident rate and traffic flow can be found in Vitaliano and Held (1991) and 
Hauer and Bamfo (1997). The relationship between accident frequency or 
accident rate and traffic flows show a great variation in theirs results.  
 
Jovanis and Chang (1986), Abdel-Aty and Essam Radwan (2000) and 
Persaud et al (2000) point out that accident frequency increases with Average 
Annual Daily Traffic (AADT). On the other hand, Vitaliano and Held (1991) 
cannot detect any significant increase in the accident rate when AADT 
increases. According to Hauer and Bamfo (1997) the accident rate even 
decreases with an increasing AADT.  
 
Few studies have analyzed the effect of heterogeneous flows, and specifically 
the effect that the presence of heavy good vehicles (HGVs) in the traffic flow 
has on accidents. Hiselius (2004) analyzed the relationship between accident 
frequency and traffic flow in four different road types according to speed 
limit and road width in two conditions: homogenous and heterogeneous 
traffic. The results show that the expected number of accidents increases less 
than proportionally with the traffic flow, in the homogenous case. For the 
heterogeneous case, the expected number of accidents decreases with 
increasing number of trucks. According to Arenas et al (2009), the expected 
number of accident increases with the addition of one vehicle in AADT, and 
increases with one additional HGV when comparing high capacity roads to 
single carriageway roads.  
 
Other studies have been carried out to establish relationships between 
accidents and the frequency of intersections (Ivan and O‘Mara 1997), 
environmental factor (Fridstrøm et al 1995; Shankar et al 1995; Chang 2005; 
Caliendo et al 2007), geometric infrastructure characteristics (Hauer, 2004; 
Chang, 2005), number of lanes (Milton and Mannering, 1998; Noland and 
Oh, 2004), and speed limits (Fridstrøm et al., 1995; Ossiander and 
Cummings, 2002). In this paper, Poisson and negative binomial (NB) 
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regression models were applied to know the relationship between safety 
incentives and road safety in Spain. This paper focuses on variables related to 
traffic flow, infrastructure characteristics (intersections), road operation  and 
incentives given to the PPP contractors. The authors have not found any 
empirical study about safety incentives offered to the PPP contractors.  
 
DATA FOR THE CASE OF SPAIN 
The models that were calibrated in this paper cover the year 2006. We chose 
this year because it is the most recent year where a complete database is 
available. 
 
The data used for the empirical model came from two different sources: 
police-reported accident data supplied by the Ministry of Internal Affairs 
(Ministerio del Interior, 2006) and traffic data supplied by the Ministry of 
Public Works (Ministerio de Fomento, 2006). Using these databases it was 
necessary to build the final database combining both accident data and traffic 
data. The population for the models were made up of road stretches of the 
Spanish high-capacity network both PPP motorways (toll motorways) and 
public motorways (autovías).  
 
Some exogenous variables that may potentially influence safety and do not 
depend on the concessionaire‘s ability to manage the road were selected. 
These are: continuous variables such as (1) Average annual daily traffic 
(AADT), (2) Percentage of heavy goods vehicles (%HGV) and (3) Number 
of intersections for each stretch (INT) and two selected variables that may 
explain any relation between PPPs and accidents, (4) Road operation (RO) 
and (5) Incentives (INC). Furthermore, in order to fit the model it was 
considered the vehicle exposure (vk). It was measured in millions of vehicle-
kilometers as vkj = 365 lj AADTj/10
6
, where AADTj and lj are respectively 
the average annual daily traffic and length (km) of road section j obtained 
from traffic database. 
 
The number of intersections for each stretch (INT) introduced as discrete 
value with 2 levels (it takes 1 for stretches with at least 1 intersection and it 
takes 0 otherwise) was obtained from the Geographic Information System 
(GIS), the analyses was performed using ArcGis 9.2. Each stretch of the 
sample was analyzed using the GIS application to count the number of 
intersections. 
 
Data for Road operation (RO), introduced in models as categorical variable, 
was obtained from the Traffic map 2006 (Ministry of Public Works). The 
roadway segmentation is defined by the Ministry of Public Works (Ministerio 
22 
 
de Fomento, 2006b), which can be for the case of the Spanish high capacity 
network: second generation autovías (AV), first generation autovías (1AV) 
or toll motorways (TM). TH are PPPs, AV and 1AV are public motorways. 
 
To know which segments had road safety incentives (INC) it was analyzed 
each concession contract in force in 2006. The first Spanish concession 
contract awarded with implementation of road safety incentives was in 2002. 
All of the contracts from 2002 to 2006 were analyzed. INC is a discrete 
variable with 2 levels (it takes 1 for stretches with safety incentives and it 
takes 0 otherwise).  
 
For this study, the dependent variables are the fatal, injury and accident rates. 
1,042 road segments were extracted out of a total of 6,293 from the 2006 
traffic map, after selection criteria based on complete information for traffic 
flow and infrastructure variables. It was considered stretches with and 
without accidents to avoid selection bias. The study includes PPPs (toll 
motorways) and public motorways (first and second generation autovías). For 
this study was considered only stretches of the Spanish Interurban Road State 
Network. The final data base represents 62% of the total Spanish high-
capacity network. The total number of segments (with and without accidents) 
and the length by road operation are presented in Table 1.    
 
Table 1. Road segment data 
 












AV 275 287  562     26.39 27.54 53.93 3,790.46 
1AV 43 266  309 4.13 25.53 29.66 2,285.02 
TM 60 111  171 5.76 10.65 16.41 1,372.24 
Total 378  664 1,042 36.28 63.72 100 7,447.72 
 
The descriptive statistics are represented in Table 2. The descriptive statistics 
indicate that the mean traffic intensity (AADT) is higher on 1AV than AV 
and TM. The low traffic intensity in TM could be explained because the users 
pay tolls. 
 
There is more heavy good vehicles traffic in public motorways (AV and 
1AV) than PPPs (TM). The range and the standard deviation in AV and 1AV 






Table 2. Descriptive statistics by road operation and total. Year 2006 
 
Variables Road operation Mean S.D. Range Minimum Maximum 
AADT AV 23,686.04 21,875.96 139,040.00 1,270.00 140,310.00 
1AV 35,735.05 34,262.09 186,365.00 5,135.00 191,500.00 
TM 16,508.43 12,950.00 58,093.00 1,094.00 59,187.00 
Total 26,080.92 26,046.31 190,406.00 1,094.00 191,500.00 
%HGV AV 18.53 10.12 72.40 2.80 75.20 
1AV 23.37 8.95 48.10 4.60 52.70 
TM 10.35 5.39 32.60 1.50 34.10 
Total 18.63 10.08 73.70 1.50 75.20 
INT AV 
2.08 1.21 8.00 0.00 8.00 
1AV 
2.38 1.59 12.00 0.00 12.00 
TM 
1.54 0.70 3.00 0.00 3.00 
Total 2.08 1.29 12.00 0.00 12.00 
vk AV 52.28 56.22 451.28 0.42 451.70 
1AV 79.25 70.65 355.89 3.13 359.02 
TM 42.51 42.91 250.19 0.48 250.67 
Total 58.68 60.60 451.28 0.42 451.70 
 
METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS 
Poisson and NB regressions were applied to determine the relationship 
between fatalities, injuries and accidents and traffic variables, number of 
intersections for each stretch, road operation and road safety incentives 
offered to the concessionaire. In this work the response variables are number 
of fatalities, injuries and accidents. 
 
The Poisson overdispersion parameter indicates that the data may be 
overdispersed. When Pearson's chi-square divided by the degrees of freedom 
is greater than 1, the data may be overdispersed, otherwise the data may be 
underdispersed. All Poisson models presented Value/df greater than 1, 
therefore it was necessary to test the NB as an alternative model, which 
enables the variance of the dependent variable to differ from its mean. 
 
The accident rate of the   segment (    is defined as the expected number of 
accidents ( [  ]) per million-vehicle km. Therefore the regression model is 
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then expressed as  [  ]       , using the log-link function to relate the 
response to the linear predictor.  
 
The general expression for the estimated model is: 
 
 [   ]̂     (  ̂  ∑  ̂ 
 
   
     ̂      ) 
 
With the restriction  ̂    
The accident rate is expressed as:  ̂   
 [   ]
̂
   
 
                                                                                                                              
 
Table 3 summarizes the estimated NB regressions. Each column refers to a 
model with the endogenous variables and every row to exogenous variables. 
There is an estimated parameters for each variable. The significance of 
coefficients was checked using Wald statistic (in bracket), which rejects the 
null hypothesis that the coefficient is zero with a level of 95% confidence.  
Different goodness-of-fit statistics were used to select the model such as 
deviance, log-likelihood and Pearson chi-square statistics. Other measures 
were also evaluated such as Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) (Akaike, 
1974) and the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) (Schwarz, 1978). 
 
A criterion for variables inclusion was used by testing the likelihood ratio 
(LR). In addition, the correlation coefficient between them was prevented. 
 
After analyzing Table 3, it could highlight the following results: 
 
1. Log(AADT) is statistically significant for the fatality, injury and accident 
rates. The coefficient signs are negative for all models (fatalities, injuries and 
accidents), suggesting that a greater AADT is associated with lower rates for 
fatalities, injuries and accidents. This result confirms the hypothesis proposed 
by Vitaliano and Held (1991) and Hauer and Bamfo (1997) that accident 
rates decrease when AADT increases.  
 
2. Log(%HGV) was found to be statistically significant for injury and 
accident models. The coefficient signs are negative for all models. This 
means that the larger the percentage of heavy good vehicles the smaller the 
injury and accident rates. This could be related to the speed reduction that 
heavy vehicles impose to light vehicles on the traffic flow. This result is in 





3. INC variable showed the expected negative sign, suggesting that 
establishing incentives in the PPP contracts is associated with lower rates for 
fatalities, injuries and accidents. The coefficient signs do not change in all 
models. This variable was found to be statistically significant for injury and 
accident models.    
 
4. The INT (intersection) variable showed the expected positive signs 
suggesting that the increased number of intersections is associated with the 
increased level of fatalities, injuries and accidents. There are more fatalities, 
injuries and accidents in stretches with at least one intersection than stretches 
without intersections. However, this variable was found to be statistically 
insignificant.  
 
The main reason for the insignificance of INT in the models could be that the 
kind of roads used for the analysis does not have at grade intersections which 
are those that most affect road safety. The Spanish high capacity network 
only has grade-separated intersections. These types of intersections reduce 
the accident potential due to vertical separation of traffic. This result is in line 
with the findings of Ivan and O‘Mara (1997).  
 
5. RO indicates that there is a differentiated behavior among toll motorways, 
second generation autovías and first generation autovías.  
 
Toll motorways (TM) showed the expected negative sign in all models 
suggesting that there are fewer fatalities, injuries and accidents in toll 
motorways compared to AV, which is the reference class. In other words, toll 
motorways managed and operated by the private sector turn out to be safer 
that free motorways managed and operated by the public sector. 
 
The only odd result that was found in the analysis is that the variable 1AV 
has an unexpected negative sign suggesting that 1AV has fewer fatalities, 
injuries and accidents compared to AV. This result is strange because, as 
mentioned earlier in this paper, first generation autovías (1AV) have poorer 
design standards than second generation autovías (AV). The main reason for 
that is that first generation autovías are among the busiest motorways in 
Spain in terms of traffic so the AADT in these motorways is often close to 
their capacity and consequently the speed of the flow is lower, which 
improves safety ratios. 
 
The expressions of fatality, injury and accident rates for different road 
operations can be determined by the parameters estimated in Table 2. As one 





Toll motorways segments with incentives – without intersection: 
  ̂         (    
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅        (    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅              
Toll motorways segments with incentives – at least 1 intersection:  
 ̂         (    
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Toll motorways segments without incentives – without intersection: 
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Toll motorways segments without incentives – at least 1 intersection: 
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Intercept     0.936 0.334 -0.677
 
    (0.403) (0.269) (0.947) 
Log(AADT) S 
  
-0.700a -0.157a -0.106b 
(37.977) (10.016) (4.031) 
Log(%HGV) S 
  
-0.084 -0.470a -0.507a 
(0.236) (37.863) (37.781) 
INC  C 
stretch with 
incentives 
-0.818 -0.676c -0.943b 
(0.552) (2.670) (3.946) 
INT  S   0.817 0.125
 0.167 






(2.954) (11.809) (7.562) 
1AV -0.511
b -0.405a -0.423a 
(6.545) (23.900) (22.610) 
Log(vk) S   1 1 1 
Deviance (Dp)   579.862 2,562.148 1,933.346 
Pearson Chi-Square (X2)    1,669.727 4,202.451 2,784.678 
Log Likelihood   -486.091 -2,462.047 -1,978.212 
AIC   986.183 4,938.093 3,970.424 
BIC   1,021.121 4,973.032 4,005.362 
Overdispersion parameter (k)    1.546 3.891 2.578 








From these expressions it can observe clearly that the incentives given to the 
concessionaires have a positive impact on reducing accident rates. For 
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stretches without intersection, the number of accidents per 1 million vehicle-
kilometers is about 2.66 times higher in toll motorways without incentives 
compared to toll motorways with incentives. And, for stretches with at least 1 
intersection, the number of accidents per 1 million vehicle-kilometers is 
about 2.55 times higher in toll motorways without incentives compared to toll 
motorways with incentives. 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
The most important result from this research is that safety-based incentives in 
PPPs is an effective measure to manage motorways. In other words, there are 
more fatalities, injuries and accidents on motorways segments without 
incentives than on motorways segments with incentives.  
 
The INC variable was found to be statistically significant in the injury and 
accident model. However, if incentives have an impact on road accidents, 
they have an impact on fatalities as well, because of the negative sign in fatal 
models. If incentives given to the concessionaires avoid accidents, they avoid 
fatalities which are a consequence of accidents. The results indicate that 
incentives have an influence on road safety. 
 
This paper has paved the way for new topics that undoubtedly would require 
further research. First, the analysis of the size of the economic incentive set 
up in the PPP contract on the ultimate improvement of safety ratios is a 
crucial aspect. Second, it would be useful to analyze the evolution of safety 
performance over the years in PPP motorways with safety-based incentives. 
Third, a cross-cutting comparison of the different types of incentives 
(incentives related to the deadline of the project vs incentives related to 
payments) would be of the greatest interest.  
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